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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CV 09-01778 MHP

AMJAD ABUDIAB

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,  
et al.,

Defendants.

**MEMORANDUM & ORDER**

**Re:** Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary  
Judgment

Amjad Abudiab ("plaintiff"), a limousine driver, brings this action against the City and County of San Francisco ("City"), Elias Georgopoulos ("Georgopoulos") and Antonio Parra ("Parra"), (collectively "defendants"), alleging assault, battery and violations of civil rights under state and federal law. Before the court is defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. Having considered the parties' submissions and arguments, the court enters the following memorandum and order.

**BACKGROUND**

I. **Factual Background**

The facts underlying this case were previously recounted by the court in its Memorandum and Order denying defendants' first motion for partial summary judgment. Docket No. 39 (April 12, 2010 Order ("First Order")). These facts are restated below.

At the time of the events at issue, defendant Elias Georgopoulos was a Senior Parking Control Officer ("PCO") employed by the parking enforcement division of the San Francisco

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1 Municipal Transit Authority. PCOs, such as Georgopoulos, are responsible for issuing citations for  
2 illegal parking. There is no dispute that defendant PCO is not a “peace officer” and has no authority  
3 either to arrest or issue moving violations. Defendant is authorized to use limited force during the  
4 performance of his duties namely, to use City-issued pepper spray as a means of self-defense.  
5 Defendant PCO had also been issued a uniform that indicated his affiliation with the San Francisco  
6 Municipal Transit Authority and not the San Francisco Police Department (“SFPD”).

7 On May 6, 2008, defendant PCO was in uniform and on-duty patrolling the streets of San  
8 Francisco. Plaintiff and defendant PCO encountered each other while they were in their respective  
9 vehicles: plaintiff in his Lincoln Town Car and defendant PCO in his City-issued Geo Metro  
10 Compact Sedan. As plaintiff made a right turn from Eddy Street onto Franklin Street, defendant  
11 PCO honked his horn. After plaintiff turned, defendant PCO drew even with plaintiff’s car and the  
12 two men argued about plaintiff’s driving. Defendant PCO also made hand gestures at plaintiff. At a  
13 subsequent red light, while seated in their respective cars, both individuals continued to argue  
14 loudly.

15 Shortly after this exchange, approximately nineteen (19) blocks north of Eddy Street,  
16 plaintiff turned left from Franklin Street onto Greenwich Street. Defendant PCO followed him.  
17 Without being asked to stop, plaintiff stopped his car in the middle of Greenwich Street, so that he  
18 was double-parked. Defendant pulled up behind plaintiff, turned on the flashing yellow light located  
19 on top of his City-issued Geo Metro and honked his horn at plaintiff. Both plaintiff and defendant  
20 PCO exited their vehicles and approached one another. Defendant PCO began writing plaintiff a  
21 ticket for double-parking, and again, the two men shouted obscenities, insults and threats.  
22 Defendant PCO also allegedly aimed his City-issued canister of pepper spray at plaintiff. Plaintiff  
23 returned to his vehicle and called the police for assistance. The police arrived and diffused the  
24 scene. The two men left the area, but not before the police delivered plaintiff the parking ticket,  
25 written by defendant PCO, for being double-parked. Plaintiff paid this ticket in full.

26 A few hours later, plaintiff walked into the Fillmore Street entrance of the KFC/Taco Bell  
27 restaurant located at 2101 Lombard Street, on the corner of Fillmore and Lombard streets.  
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1 Unbeknownst to plaintiff, defendant PCO was at the same restaurant. After plaintiff noticed  
2 defendant PCO, the two again exchanged words and plaintiff turned to leave. Defendant PCO  
3 followed plaintiff out of the restaurant through the Lombard Street exit and began pepper spraying  
4 plaintiff on the sidewalk. Defendant PCO does not claim that the pepper spray was used in self-  
5 defense. Plaintiff then spat at defendant PCO. Defendant PCO subsequently punched plaintiff once  
6 in the back of the head.

7 The physical altercation that took place outside the KFC/Taco Bell was visible to bystanders.  
8 One such bystander, Erik Reinertson, a member of the California bar, submitted a declaration  
9 corroborating many of these events. Specifically, Reinertson testifies that defendant PCO punched  
10 plaintiff in the face as plaintiff was backing away. Thereafter, defendant PCO continued to follow  
11 plaintiff as plaintiff backed away. After being punched, plaintiff crossed the street, stood next to  
12 Reinertson and showed Reinertson the pepper spray residue on his face and glasses.

13 At this point, plaintiff again called the police, who took statements from multiple individuals.  
14 Thereafter, the police arrested plaintiff for a violation of California Penal Code section 241(b).<sup>1</sup> All  
15 charges were later dropped.

16 II. Procedural Background

17 Plaintiff first filed this action in San Francisco County Superior Court, and on April 23,  
18 2009, defendants removed the action to this court. Plaintiff alleged assault, battery, intentional  
19 infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring/retention and violations of civil rights under 42  
20 U.S.C. section 1983. On February 16, 2010, defendants moved for partial summary judgment as to  
21 plaintiff's section 1983 claims, arguing that Georgopoulos was not acting under color of state law as  
22 required by section 1983. The court denied defendants' motion, declining to conclude as a matter of  
23 law that Georgopoulos was not acting under color of state law.

24 On October 5, 2010, plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), adding a cause of  
25 action under Cal. Civ. Code section 52.1 and eliminating his claims of intentional infliction of  
26 emotional distress and negligent hiring/retention. *See* Docket No. 61 (FAC). Defendants now bring  
27 a second motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that defendants did not violate plaintiff's  
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1 right to free speech, plaintiff's fourth amendment rights against excessive force, unlawful arrest and  
2 malicious prosecution or plaintiff's fourteenth amendment rights. Defendants also argue that  
3 plaintiff may sustain neither his section 52.1 claim nor his prayer for punitive damages.

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5 **LEGAL STANDARD**

6 Summary judgment may be granted only when, drawing all inferences and resolving all  
7 doubts in favor of the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving  
8 party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); *see generally Anderson v.*  
9 *Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 247-55 (1986). A fact is "material" if it may affect the outcome  
10 of the proceedings, and an issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a  
11 reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. *Id.* at 248. The court may not make  
12 credibility determinations. *Id.* at 255. The moving party bears the burden of identifying those  
13 portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of  
14 material fact. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party meets its  
15 initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or  
16 discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c);  
17 *see Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 250.

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19 **DISCUSSION**

20 I. **Free Speech Claims**

21 Defendants argue that plaintiff used only "fighting words" that generally are not accorded  
22 First Amendment protection. "To characterize speech as actionable 'fighting words,' the  
23 government must prove that there existed 'a likelihood that the person addressed would make an  
24 immediate violent response.'" *United States v. Poocha*, 259 F.3d 1077, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2001). "In  
25 light of our 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues shall be  
26 uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes  
27 unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials,' the area of speech unprotected as

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1 fighting words is at its narrowest, if indeed it exists at all, with respect to criminal prosecution for  
2 speech directed at public officials.” *Id.* (quoting *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 270  
3 (1964)).

4 Defendants argue that “[p]laintiff’s only speech was to insult and curse at Georgopoulos”,  
5 Docket No. 101 (Defendants’ Motion) at 9:3-4, and that because plaintiff’s words were “inherently  
6 likely to provoke violent reaction” from Georgopoulos, plaintiff’s words should not be accorded  
7 First Amendment protection. *Id.* (quoting *Cohen v. California*, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)). Plaintiff,  
8 however, proffers evidence that although plaintiff insulted and cursed at Georgopoulos, he did so at  
9 least in part as a criticism of the manner in which Georgopoulos conducted his official duties as a  
10 parking officer. *See, e.g.*, Docket No. 111-4 (Williams Depo.) at 68. In addition, plaintiff proffers  
11 evidence that plaintiff walked away from Georgopoulos in the KFC/Taco Bell as well as attempted  
12 to escape from Georgopoulos while Georgopoulos pepper sprayed then punched plaintiff,  
13 contradicting defendants’ assertion that plaintiff threatened and challenged Georgopoulos to a fight  
14 in conjunction with uttering fighting words.<sup>2</sup> Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to  
15 plaintiff, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether at least some portion of plaintiff’s speech  
16 contained a criticism of Georgopoulos’ unprofessional behavior and what plaintiff perceived to be  
17 Georgopoulos’ issuance of an unwarranted parking ticket out of spite, anger or retaliation.  
18 Additionally, the finder of fact could reasonably conclude that plaintiff’s speech was not “coupled  
19 with a threat to fight”, Defendants’ Motion at 3:9-10, but that Georgopoulos was the instigator, and  
20 in fact the only perpetrator, of the violence that occurred.

21 Nor is the fact that plaintiff used expletives itself dispositive. In *Poocha*, National Park  
22 Service rangers attempted to arrest an individual in Yosemite National Park, and a group of  
23 spectators, including Poocha, formed to observe. 259 F.3d at 1078. Upset by what he perceived as  
24 unwarranted official action, Poocha, among others, began to shout obscenities at the rangers. *Id.* A  
25 ranger approached Poocha and ordered him to back away from the official action and to leave.  
26 According to the ranger, in response Poocha shouted, “fuck you” and other profanities while  
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1 clenching his fists and sticking out his chest. *Id.* at 1079. Poocha was charged with and convicted of  
2 disorderly conduct in violation of federal law. *Id.*

3 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered the lawfulness of the arrest of Poocha in light of the  
4 First Amendment. The court determined that “Poocha used profanity to express his disapproval of  
5 an officer’s conduct. Criticism of the police, profane or otherwise, is not a crime.” *Id.* at 1082 (“We  
6 have repeatedly emphasized that while police, no less than anyone else, may resent having obscene  
7 words and gestures directed at them, they may not exercise the awesome power at their disposal to  
8 punish individuals for conduct that is not merely lawful, but protected by the First Amendment.”  
9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Concluding that “the natural import of his speech  
10 was an expression of criticism of the police, not an incitement of the crowd to act,” the Ninth Circuit  
11 held that the speech at issue, expletives and all, was constitutionally protected. *Id.* Here, the finder  
12 of fact could reasonably conclude that the essence of at least some portion of plaintiff’s profane  
13 speech was rooted in criticism of Georgopoulos in his official capacity, and that it was unreasonable  
14 for Georgopoulos to react by assaulting plaintiff with his City-issued pepper spray.

15 In further support of the notion that plaintiff’s sole intent was to insult and not criticize,  
16 however, defendants point to evidence that plaintiff expressed such sentiments as “get a real job,”  
17 questioned Georgopoulos’ authority to issue a violation and used expletives directed at  
18 Georgopoulos. *See, e.g.*, Docket No. 102-1 (Abudiab Depo.) at 37:23-41:9-13. Viewing the facts in  
19 the light most favorable to plaintiff, however, the finder of fact could reasonably infer that criticism  
20 of Georgopoulos in his official capacity was implicit in these statements, and that because the  
21 interaction stemmed from conduct that Georgopoulos engaged in in his official capacity while acting  
22 under color of state law, plaintiff’s speech, although profane, was directed toward that official  
23 conduct and not in fact personal. Indeed, the finder of fact could reasonably conclude that the  
24 speech was firmly rooted in criticism of official conduct, even though “unpleasant” and “tasteless”  
25 in nature. *Id.* Moreover, consistent with *Poocha*, the finder of fact could reasonably conclude that as  
26 a public official whose duties often incite the vitriol of the public, and who consequently is  
27 authorized to use force against members of the public (deployment of pepper spray in self-defense),  
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1 Georgopoulos should be held to a higher standard of conduct in terms of his reaction to mere  
2 criticisms, profane and otherwise, of the manner in which he conducts his official duties.

3 Defendants next argue that even if plaintiff's speech was protected, plaintiff is unable to  
4 establish that "Georgopoulos took action against plaintiff because of his speech." Defendants'  
5 Motion at 9:9-10. Defendants argue that Georgopoulos "did not hit or pepper spray [p]laintiff  
6 because of the content of plaintiff's speech" but because plaintiff "sought out and then aggressively  
7 approached Georgopoulos in the restaurant." *Id.* at 9:25-10:1. Plaintiff, however, offers evidence to  
8 support the contrary conclusion. *See* Docket No. 103 (Georgopoulos Dec.), Exh. A (Surveillance  
9 Video). The surveillance video shows plaintiff walking up to Georgopoulos, saying something very  
10 briefly, then walking away from Georgopoulos out the door. *Id.* Williams, a witness to the  
11 interaction between Georgopoulos and plaintiff in the KFC/Taco Bell, testified that plaintiff spoke  
12 angrily to Georgopoulos about the parking ticket, but did not appear to touch Georgopoulos and then  
13 turned and walked away from Georgopoulos. Williams Depo. at 68. The video shows Georgopoulos  
14 following plaintiff out the door and appearing to reach for something on his utility belt. *Id.* Plaintiff  
15 argues that the video reflects that plaintiff directed a brief expletive toward Georgopoulos in order to  
16 continue the expression of his critique of Georgopoulos' issuance of an unwarranted parking citation  
17 and then turned to leave. Plaintiff further contends that Georgopoulos consequently followed  
18 plaintiff outside the restaurant and assaulted plaintiff with pepper spray and his fists in retaliation for  
19 plaintiff's criticisms.

20 Defendants characterize this interaction in a completely different fashion, explaining that the  
21 video shows plaintiff physically threatening Georgopoulos. Defendants contend that Georgopoulos  
22 merely directed plaintiff outside to protect the patrons of the KFC/Taco Bell from plaintiff's alleged  
23 violent intentions. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, however, a genuine  
24 issue of material fact exists as to whether Georgopoulos retaliated against plaintiff on account of  
25 plaintiff's critical speech.

26 Lastly, defendants argue that Georgopoulos is entitled to qualified immunity. "A finding of  
27 qualified immunity depends on a two-part inquiry by the court." *Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu*, 335 F.3d  
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1 970, 976 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing *Saucier v. Katz*, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) overruled on other  
2 grounds by *Pearson v. Callahan*, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)). The court must determine whether the facts  
3 alleged, “taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,” show the violation of a  
4 constitutional right, and whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. *Id*; see  
5 *Blankenhorn v. City of Orange*, 485 F.3d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing *Beier v. City of Lewiston*,  
6 354 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Defendants are entitled to such relief only if the facts alleged  
7 and evidence submitted . . . show that their conduct did not violate a federal right; or, if it did, the  
8 scope of that right was not clearly established at the time.”)).

9 Having determined above that the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that a constitutional  
10 violation occurred, the court must determine whether the law was clearly established. Defendants  
11 first argue that there was no existing precedent stating that parking enforcement officers such as  
12 Georgopoulos “should be treated *like* peace officers in determining whether words are ‘fighting  
13 words’ under the First Amendment.” Defendants’ Motion at 11:12-13. Whether speech is deemed to  
14 be “fighting words” for the purposes of First Amendment protection does not rest upon whether the  
15 listener is a peace officer rather than a parking officer, but rather whether the speech is likely to  
16 incite immediate violence. Peace officers are merely subjected to higher standard in terms of  
17 whether speech may incite them to “exercise the awesome power at their disposal to punish  
18 individuals for conduct that is not merely lawful, but protected by the First Amendment.” *Poocha*,  
19 259 F.3d at 1082. Whether words are “fighting” goes to the issue of whether the speech to begin  
20 with is eligible for First Amendment protections, and as stated above, here there is a genuine issue of  
21 material fact whether plaintiff’s speech, although profane, was “fighting” or rooted in criticism. See  
22 *Skoog v. County of Clackamas*, 469 F.3d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting *Mendocino Envtl. Ctr.*  
23 v. Mendocino Cty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (What is relevant is whether the speaker is  
24 engaging in critical speech protected under the Constitution and whether the purported retaliatory  
25 acts ““would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment  
26 activities.”)).

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1       “When considering the qualified immunity defense in the retaliation context, courts must  
2 strike an appropriate balance between protecting First Amendment rights, on the one hand, and  
3 protecting *government officials* from the disruption caused by unfounded claims, on the other.” *Id.*  
4 (emphasis added). As reflected above, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the  
5 trier of fact could reasonably conclude that plaintiff’s speech was a protected criticism of  
6 Georgopoulos as he acted in his official capacity and directly related to what plaintiff perceived to  
7 be the unfair issuance of a parking citation. The finder of fact could similarly conclude that  
8 Georgopoulos’ violent actions would chill or silence future legitimate criticisms of parking officers’  
9 activities, and it was well-established at the time of the incident that retaliation for such speech,  
10 engaged in by an individual acting under color of state law, would not comport with the law. *See,*  
11 *e.g.*, *Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan*, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Deliberate retaliation  
12 by state actors against an individual’s exercise [First Amendment rights] is actionable under section  
13 1983.”) Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to this claim is DENIED.

14 II. Fourth Amendment Claims

15 A. Excessive Force

16 Plaintiff alleges that Georgopoulos used excessive force, in violation of the Fourth  
17 Amendment, by repeatedly spraying plaintiff with pepper spray and by punching plaintiff in the back  
18 of the head. Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim should be analyzed under the Fourteenth  
19 Amendment instead of the Fourth Amendment because for claims of excessive force against a  
20 government actor who lacks the authority to use force, the proper avenue for relief is the Fourteenth  
21 Amendment. Defendants’ Motion at 12:18-19. Defendants concede, however, that Georgopoulos  
22 was in fact authorized to use limited force against the public. Defendants do not dispute that the  
23 City issued pepper spray to Georgopoulos and authorized its use in instances of self-defense during  
24 the course of his employment as a parking officer. Thus, by the defendants’ own argument,  
25 plaintiff’s claim is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, especially as the excessive force  
26 alleged by plaintiff is exactly the force that Georgopoulos was authorized to use: pepper spray  
27 deployment.

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1 Defendants also seek to convince the court that because PCOs are not peace officers, they are  
2 categorically not law enforcement officers, and the Fourth Amendment's proscription against  
3 excessive force may never apply to them. California Penal Code section 830.1 defines a peace  
4 officer and excludes parking officers. State law, however, does not similarly define a "law  
5 enforcement officer" in such an exclusive manner. Rather, review of state case law as well as the  
6 City's own municipal code reveals that state courts and the municipal code have not adopted such a  
7 limited view of which state actors may qualify as law enforcement officers, but rather have  
8 concluded that, based on a varying set of facts, some non-peace officer state actors are in fact law  
9 enforcement officers. In short, contrary to defendants' arguments, while all peace officers are law  
10 enforcement officers, not all law enforcement officers are peace officers.

11 For example, in *Sims v. Superior Court*, 18 Cal.App.4th 463 (1993), the state Court of  
12 Appeal considered whether a Franchise Tax Board investigator was a law enforcement officer for  
13 the purposes of offering evidence pursuant to California Penal Code section 872(d), which limits  
14 hearsay evidence to law enforcement officers. The court noted that the "omission" of this type of  
15 investigator from the statute defining peace officers, and thus law enforcement officers, was "not  
16 determinative." *Id.* at 469. "[R]ather, the critical inquiry is whether [the investigator's]  
17 qualifications and duties are commensurate with those of individuals upon whom the Legislature  
18 has, for whatever reason, conferred 'peace officer' status." *Id.* The court concluded that in this  
19 context, a law enforcement officer was not limited to "'traditional' law enforcement officers  
20 authorized to carry weapons and make arrests, but rather is intended to encompass officers and  
21 agents with knowledge of the pertinent laws underlying the charged crime who can provide  
22 meaningful testimony at preliminary hearings." *Id.* at 465. Accordingly, the term law enforcement  
23 officer "applie[d] to officers and agents employed by a federal, state or local government agency: 1)  
24 who meet the threshold training and experience requirements set forth in [section 827]; and 2) whose  
25 primary responsibility is to investigate and prepare for prosecution cases involving violations of  
26 laws." *Id.*; see also, *People v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co.*, 69 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1098 (1999) ("Thus,  
27 the courts in both *Martin*[v. Superior Court], 230 Cal.App.3d 11921 (1991)] and *Sims* concluded that  
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1 the key to determining whether or not an individual is a law enforcement officer is if his or her  
2 primary duty is the enforcement of the law.”).

3 In addition, several places in the municipal code call into question defendants’ assertion that  
4 only peace officers are law enforcement officers. For example, the San Francisco Administrative  
5 Code, with respect to its Policy Making Marijuana Offenses the Lowest Law Enforcement Priority,  
6 states that a ““San Francisco law enforcement officer’ means any peace officer employed by the City  
7 and County of San Francisco, *and any other employee of the City and County who is authorized to*  
8 *engage in law enforcement activity.*” S.F. Admin. Code § 12X.4(b) (emphasis added). With respect  
9 to the Building Code, “building officials” are granted the powers of a law enforcement officer.  
10 Section 89.124 states, “[t]he Building Official is hereby authorized and directed to enforce all the  
11 provisions of this code. For such purposes, *the Building Official shall have the powers of a law*  
12 *enforcement officer.* The Building Official, when necessary, may call upon the Police Department  
13 and other city agencies for aid or assistance in carrying out or enforcing any of the provisions of this  
14 code.” S.F. Building Inspection Commission Codes § 89.124(A).

15 While neither the cases nor the code sections cited definitively characterize PCOs as law  
16 enforcement officers, they do suggest that whether a government actor, such as a PCO, is a law  
17 enforcement officer is dependant largely on whether the primary duty of the actor in question is to  
18 enforce the laws of the jurisdiction or the laws as duly enacted by the legislature. With respect to  
19 PCOs, San Francisco Transportation Code section 1.1(b)(15) defines a PCO as, “[a] City employee  
20 *authorized by the Municipal Transportation Agency to enforce state laws and the San Francisco*  
21 *Transportation Code related to Parking of vehicles.*” (emphasis added). From the plain language of  
22 the Code, it appears that law enforcement is the primary duty of a PCO. Moreover, in enforcing the  
23 City’s traffic laws, Georgopoulos, and other PCOs, were authorized to use force against the public as  
24 reflected by the City’s issuance of pepper spray for use in self-defense. *See Docket No. 111-1*  
25 (Georgopoulos Depo.) at 46. Accordingly, the court concludes that Georgopoulos was indeed a law  
26 enforcement officer because his primary duty was the enforcement of the City’s traffic laws, and

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1 because viewing the facts in favor of plaintiff, the finder of fact could reasonably conclude while  
2 acting under that under color of state law, Georgopoulos used unreasonable force against plaintiff.

3 Defendants argue that even if a constitutional violation occurred, Georgopoulos is entitled to  
4 qualified immunity because no parking officer has previously been held to account for violating the  
5 Fourth Amendment's prohibition against excessive force. Accordingly, defendants argue that a  
6 parking officer in Georgopoulos' position could not have reasonably believed that using  
7 unreasonable force while acting under color of state law was violative of the Fourth Amendment.  
8 Plaintiff, in opposition, makes no argument with respect to defendants' claim of qualified immunity,  
9 cites to no authority that would support the notion that the law was clearly established and therefore  
10 appears to concede that Georgopoulos is entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim.<sup>3</sup>

11 Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of defendants.

12       B.     Unlawful Arrest

13 Defendants argue that plaintiff's claim of unlawful arrest may not stand. In opposition,  
14 plaintiff makes no argument with respect to this claim. Accordingly, summary judgment is  
15 GRANTED in favor of defendants.

16       C.     Malicious Prosecution

17 Plaintiff bases his claim of malicious prosecution solely on a violation of section 1983 and  
18 does not allege a state law-based claim of malicious prosecution. In considering this claim,  
19 however, the court factors into its analysis the state common law tort of malicious prosecution  
20 because the state standard is incorporated into the federal standard. *Awabdy v. City of Adelanto*, 368  
21 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).

22 In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must  
23 show that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable  
24 cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection or  
25 another specific constitutional right. Malicious prosecution actions are not limited  
to suits against prosecutors but may be brought, as here, against other persons  
who have wrongfully caused the charges to be filed. *Id.* (internal quotation marks  
and citations omitted).

26 "To prove a claim of malicious prosecution in California, the plaintiff must prove that the underlying  
27 prosecution: '(1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal

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1 termination in his, plaintiff's, favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated  
2 with malice.”” *Conrad v. United States*, 447 F.3d 760, 767 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting *Sheldon Appel*  
3 *Co. v. Albert & Oliker*, 47 Cal.3d 863 (1989)).

4 Defendants' argument that Georgopoulos may only be held liable for malicious prosecution  
5 if he was a willful participant in joint action with the state or its agents incorporates the standard by  
6 which a private individual may be held liable under section 1983. *See, e.g., Franklin v. Fox*, 312  
7 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A private individual may be liable under § 1983 if she conspired or  
8 entered joint action with a state actor.”). As the court previously determined in denying defendants'  
9 first motion for partial summary judgment however, Georgopoulos has not demonstrated that, as a  
10 matter of law, he was not acting under color of state law, and thus properly treated here as a private  
11 individual. And, “[a] plaintiff may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress violations of  
12 his rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws by a person or  
13 entity, including a municipality, acting under the color of state law.” *Awabdy*, 368 F.3d at 1066  
14 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Resolving the evidence in favor of plaintiff,  
15 Georgopoulos acted under color of state law and plaintiff need not show a conspiracy in order to  
16 hold Georgopoulos liable for malicious prosecution under section 1983. Additionally, the evidence  
17 reflects that the SFPD relied at least in part on Georgopoulos' testimony in arresting plaintiff for  
18 battery on a parking control officer. *See Docket No. 105 (Jou Dec.) ¶¶ 4,10.* Viewing the evidence  
19 in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the finder of fact could reasonably infer that plaintiff did not  
20 offensively touch Georgopoulos and that Georgopoulos lied to the SFPD for the purpose of having  
21 plaintiff arrested.

22 Finally, defendants argue that Georgopoulos is entitled to qualified immunity because no  
23 parking officer could know that he could be held liable for malicious prosecution absent some  
24 conspiracy or joint action with police. Again, defendants misstate the standard by which  
25 Georgopoulos, should he be found to have acted under color of state law, may be liable for malicious  
26 prosecution under section 1983. The Ninth Circuit has stated that “[m]alicious prosecution actions .  
27 . . may be brought, as here, against other persons who have wrongfully caused the charges to be

1 filed.” *Awabdy*, 368 F.3d at 1066 (citing *Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara*, 307 F.3d 1119,  
2 1126-27 (9th Cir.2002)). Indeed, defendants cite to no authority for their contention that non-peace  
3 officers (even non-peace officers who are acting under color of state law) may not “violate [section]  
4 1983 without conspiring with the police or the prosecution.” Docket No. 129 (Defendants’ Reply) at  
5 12:23-24. Rather, in the Ninth Circuit, plaintiff may “maintain[] his § 1983 malicious prosecution  
6 claim if he is able to prove the allegations in his complaint that the criminal proceedings were  
7 initiated on the basis of [Georgopoulos’] intentional and knowingly false accusations and other  
8 malicious conduct.” *Awabdy*, 368 F.3d at 1067. Here, defendants do not dispute that the SFPD  
9 relied at least in part on Georgopoulos’ account of the events in determining that there was probable  
10 cause to arrest Abudiab for battery on a PCO. Accordingly, Georgopoulos is not entitled to qualified  
11 immunity because per *Awabdy*, it was clearly established that non-peace officers could be held liable  
12 for malicious prosecution where a “*state or local official[] . . . engaged in wrongful or bad faith*  
13 *conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings.*” *Id.* (emphasis  
14 added). Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

15 III. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

16 As determined above, plaintiff’s claim stemming from Georgopoulos’ use of force against  
17 him is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff argues that Georgopoulos’ actions  
18 should only be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment as an alternative to their analysis under  
19 the Fourth Amendment. Because the court considered Georgopoulos’ use of force under the Fourth  
20 Amendment, the court does not analyze Georgopoulos’ actions a second time under the Fourteenth  
21 Amendment.

22 IV. Section 52.1 Claims

23 Plaintiff alleges that Georgopoulos violated California Civil Code section 52.1 by using  
24 violence to deprive him of his Fourth Amendment and First Amendment rights. Section 52.1  
25 provides for damages if a person “interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to  
26 interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or  
27 individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured  
28

1 by the Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General, or any district attorney or city  
 2 attorney . . . " Cal. Civ.Code § 52.1(a). "[S]ection 52.1 [requires] an attempted or completed act of  
 3 interference with a legal right, accompanied by a form of coercion." *Jones v. Kmart Corp.*, 17  
 4 Cal.4th 329, 333 (1998). As reflected above, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether  
 5 Georgopoulos retaliated against plaintiff, by using unreasonable force, for plaintiff's criticisms of  
 6 Georgopoulos. Accordingly, defendants' argument that plaintiff does not have a valid First  
 7 Amendment claim to support a section 52.1 claim is unavailing.

8 Defendants next argue that plaintiff's section 52.1 claim, as predicated on a First Amendment  
 9 violation, may not stand because plaintiff failed to state facts to support such a violation in his  
 10 government claim. Specifically, defendants argue that per California Government Code section  
 11 945.4, plaintiff's claim is invalid. Section 945.4 states:

12 Except as provided in Sections 946.4 and 946.6, no suit for money or damages  
 13 may be brought against a *public entity* on a cause of action for which a claim is  
 14 required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section  
 15 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of Part 3 of this division until  
 a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted  
 upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board, in  
 accordance with Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 3 of this division. (emphasis added).

16 By its own terms, section 945.4 applies to claims against a public agency and does not appear to  
 17 apply to claims against individuals. Accordingly, to the extent that this claim is made against the  
 18 City, it cannot stand. However, to the extent that it is brought against Georgopoulos in his  
 19 individual capacity, the fact that the government claim does not include specific facts supporting a  
 20 section 52.1 violation predicated upon Georgopoulos' alleged use of violence to retaliate against  
 21 plaintiff's criticisms of him does not defeat the claim.<sup>4</sup>

22 Plaintiff's section 52.1 claims, as predicated on the alleged violations of the Fourth  
 23 Amendment, may also stand because there are genuine issues of material fact whether Georgopoulos  
 24 interfered with plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by use of threats, intimidation or coercion. *See*  
 25 *Venegas v. County of Los Angeles*, 153 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1247 (2007). Accordingly, defendants'  
 26 motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

27 V. Punitive Damages

Under federal law, “oppressive conduct is a proper predicate for punitive damages under § 1983.” *Dang v. Cross*, 422 F.3d 800, 809 (9th Cir. 2005). “The plaintiff has the burden of proving that punitive damages should be awarded, and the amount, by a preponderance of the evidence.” *Id.* at 206. “Under California law, punitive damages are appropriate where a plaintiff establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is guilty of (1) fraud, (2) oppression or (3) malice. Cal. Civ.Code § 3294(a). According to the definitions provided in section 3294(c), a plaintiff may not recover punitive damages unless the defendant acted with intent or engaged in despicable conduct. The adjective ‘despicable’ connotes conduct that is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” *In re First Alliance Mortg. Co.*, 471 F.3d 977, 998 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting *Lackner v. North*, 135 Cal.App.4th 1188 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the nature of the altercation between Georgopoulos and plaintiff, including its origins, presents genuine issues of material fact. Accordingly, the court may not conclude as a matter of law that Georgopoulos’ actions were neither oppressive, malicious nor despicable. Accordingly, summary judgment as to this claim is DENIED.

VI. Monell Claims

Lastly, defendants argue that any claims that plaintiff maintains against the City that are predicated on violations of section 1983 may not stand. Plaintiff in opposition makes no argument to the contrary. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, California Civil Code section 52.1 claim (as alleged against Georgopoulos in his individual capacity) and punitive damages claim is DENIED. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s remaining Fourth Amendment claims, Fourteenth Amendment claim, *Monell* claim and California Civil Code section 52.1 claim (as alleged against the City) is GRANTED.

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2 IT IS SO ORDERED.  
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4 Dated: June 17, 2011  
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MARILYN HALL PATEL  
United States District Court Judge  
Northern District of California

**United States District Court**  
For the Northern District of California

**ENDNOTES**

1. Section 241(b) states:

2 When an assault is committed against the person of a parking control officer engaged  
3 in the performance of his or her duties, and the person committing the offense knows  
4 or reasonably should know that the victim is a parking control officer, the assault is  
5 punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars (\$2,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by both the fine and  
imprisonment.

6 2. Defendants argue that the higher standard of restraint applied to police officers in the face of  
“fighting words” does not apply here because Georgopoulos was not a peace officer. For the reasons  
7 set forth herein the court rejects defendants’ contention that Georgopoulos was not a peace officer.  
Even so, considering the general standard applied to the average person, there is a question of material  
8 fact whether plaintiff’s words were in fact fighting words -- that is to say whether they were sufficient  
to incite Georgopoulos’ violent response.

9 3. In light of the Court’s recent decision in *Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft*, \_S.Ct.\_ (2011), 2011 WL 2119220,  
10 it is uncertain whether plaintiff would be able to establish that a reasonable parking officer would have  
understood his actions here to be violative of the Fourth Amendment.

11 4. Defendants rely on *Fall River Joint Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court*, 206 Cal.App.3d 431  
12 (1988) to support their argument that section 945.4 bars plaintiff’s claim here. The court in *Fall River*  
makes no mention of section 945.4 as a limitation on claims brought against public officials in their  
13 individual capacity.

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